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CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW
vs. PROPOSED UNIFORM SECURITIES LAW
By DONALD A. PERa.CEt
Should the time-tested and value-proven California Corporate Securi-
ties Law be abandoned and in its place substituted the Proposed Uniform
Securities Act as drafted by Professor Louis Loss of Harvard University
and his associate, Edward M. Cowett? The possibility of such a substitu-
tion is currently being considered by the Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
tion, and it is because this writer believes that the problem is one of primary
importance to lawyers, legislators, securities dealers, business men, and the
California public in general that this article has been written.
It is generally conceded that there are four principal systems or philos-
ophies of securities regulations, namely: (1) the fraud system; (2) the
licensing of brokers, agents and investment counselors; (3) the disclosure
or registration system; and (4) the permit system.' It is possible for a
Proposed Uniform Securities Act to include any one, or any combination,
or all, of the foregoing four systems or philosophies of regulation.
The strange fact is that the Proposed Model Uniform Securities Act,
drafted by Professor Louis Loss, of Harvard University, and his associate,
under the sponsorship of the Merrill Foundation for Advance of Financial
Knowledge, Inc., does include the first three types of securities regulation,
but omits the permit system? What is even stranger is the fact that it is
expressly stated by Professor Loss that states may adopt any one, any
combination, or all of the three types of regulation. This, of course, would
accomplish just the opposite of uniformity in that State A might adopt
only the fraud type of regulation, State B might adopt only the licensing
of professional sellers type of regulation, State C might adopt only the
disclosure type of regulation and State D might adopt the first and second,
State E the first and third, etc., making it possible, therefore, for seven
different States to have regulations different from each other because of
having adopted a different portion or portions of the Proposed Model Uni-
form Securities Act. To be even more accurate, the proposed third type of
regulation, namely, the disclosure or registration system is broken down
by Professor Loss into three divisions: first, Registration by Notification;
t Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, State of California.
1 See BAmAwTIm & STERLING, CA oRNIA CoRioRATIoN LAW, 575-76 (1949).
2 See Loss & Cowett, A Proposed Uniform Securities Act Final Draft and Commentary,
Harvard University, June 1, 1956, p. 3: " ... it is possible in very broad terms and with a
good deal of over-simplification to categorize all of the acts as following one or more of three
basic philosophies. These are fraud prevention, broker-dealer registration, and securities regis-
tration."
second, Registration by Coordination; and third, Registration by Quali-
fication.3 This, therefore, makes it possible to increase the number of com-
binations of types of regulations to the point where there would be as many
variations between the States as there are States in the Union. If we would
add to this the permit system, there would be six types of regulation, which
will allow far more combinations than there are states available to adopt
them.
It appears to the writer that if a model act is advisable, it ought to be
the best model act obtainable, and not a series of combinations of types of
regulation which the states could adopt helter-skelter, resulting in medioc-
rity and non-uniformity.
A brief analysis of the principal systems or philosophies of securities
regulations as well as a brief review of the history of the enactment of
securities regulation statutes would be advisable before discussing the prin-
cipal problem of the California Corporate Securities Law vs. The Proposed
Model Uniform Securities Act.
Principal Systems of Regulation
Fraud.-The first system or philosophy of securities regulation enu-
merated both by Professor Loss and the writer, is the fraud system. This
is the type of regulation enacted by the State of New York and consists
principally in broadening the term "fraud" somewhat beyond the common
law definition, placing upon the shoulders of the Attorney General of the
State of New York the responsibility of investigating frauds and incipient
frauds, and seeking injunctions before the courts against the commission
of fraud in the sale of securities. This system lies on the side of the pen-
dulum where there is no regulation as contrasted with the permit system
of California, which lies on the other side of the pendulum, where there is
full and strict regulation.
Licensing of Agents and Brokers.-The second system or philosophy
of securities regulation is the so-called licensing of brokers and agents who
are the professional sellers of securities. To this has been added the licens-
ing of investment counsellors or advisers. Some states have deemed it suf-
3 (a) Registration by notification is in reality qualifying securities for sale merely by show-
ing that the corporation has operated profitably for the past five years and has not defaulted
in interest and/or dividends on senior securities for the three years immediately preceding the
proposed issue.
(b) Registration by coordination is merely qualifying securities for resale in the state by
showing that the proposed security issue is currently registered with the SEC.
(c) Registration by qualification requires filing the registration data with the state securi-
ties administrator, enabling him to impose a few minor substantive restrictions. These restric-
tions and doubt as to their effectiveness are discussed in the concluding paragraphs of this
article.
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ficient to license the professional sellers only with the view that the bulk
of securities for sale and resale will thus be controlled.
Disclosure or Registration System.-The disclosure or registration sys-
tem of regulation of securities is probably best represented by the Federal
Securities Act of 1933,' wherein Congress established the policy that the
issuer and/or underwriters should set forth in a registration statement to be
filed with. the Government and in the prospectus to be delivered to pros-
pective securities buyers, the truth and the whole truth concerning the
securities being offered. This calls for not only the truthful statement con-
cerning securities, but the obligation to state all material facts, in other
words, to make no omission of material facts. In this system there is no test
of whether the issue of securities is fair, just and equitable; rather it is
required that the seller beware except for fraudulent statements and omis-
sions. The old doctrine that the buyer shall beware appears to be revived,
leaving the burden on the prospective purchaser.
Permit System.-The fourth system of securities regulation is the per-
mit system. This system or philosophy has existed in California since the
Investment Company Act of 1913 and the Corporate Securities Act of
1917, which latter law has been amended at each session of the legislature
thereafter. Basically the permit system involves the decision of an admin-
istrative officer, namely, the Commissioner of Corporations in the State of
California, in judging upon a verified application, exhibits, and any further
investigation, whether or not he should issue a permit authorizing the sale
of securities or deny the application. In the event the Commisioner is satis-
fied, and finds upon the showing made in the application and in any further
investigation, that the proposed plan of business of the applicant and the
proposed issuance of securities are fair, just, and equitable, that the appli-
cant intends to transact its business fairly and honestly, and that the securi-
ties that it proposes to issue and the method to be used by it in issuing or
4 The SECURrT:Es AcT of 1933 is a typical disclosure or registration act wherein there is
no power or duty in the SEC to pass on the proposed securities issue as being fair, just and
equitable. Professor Loss, co-author of the model UNIFORm SECURITES LAW, in his address of
June 6, 1957, to the Mexico Stock Exchange in referring to the Federal Securities Act as being
a mere disclosure act stated as follows:
'"When Congress finally entered the scene in 1933, it decided that federal legislation
was essential because the state statutes were inadequate for what had become very
largely an interstate economy. The first major decision which Congress faced was
whether to follow the disclosure philosophy of the English statute or the more strin-
gent regulatory philosophy of the states, which was also the philosophy of the Cana-
dian provinces. The latter choice would clearly have been more consistent with the idea
of a planned economy which underlay the National Industrial Recovery Act, with its
codes for various industries. But philosophical consistency is not an outstanding char-
acteristic of legislation in a democracy. At any rate, Congress chose the milder dis-
closure philosophy of Great Britain rather than the substantive controls of the state
blue sky laws."
Nov, 1957]
disposing of them is not of such a nature, as will in his opinion work a fraud
upon the purchasers thereof, the commissioner shall issue to the applicant
a permit authorizing it to issue and dispose of securities, as therein pro-
vided, in this State, in such amounts and for such considerations and upon
such terms and conditions as the commissioner may provide in the permit.5
This reference to Sections 25507, 25508 and 25512 of the Corporate
Securities Law of the State of California goes far beyond mere disclosure
or registration. It involves the preparation of the issuance authority in a
document entitled a "Permit", in which permit there are three basic pro-
visions, namely: the recitals--disclosing a brief summary of what might
be expected to be found in the prospectus or registration statement; sec-
ondly, the issuance authority fixing the fair selling price, the terms of pay-
ment, kind of consideration, and the maximum selling expense and com-
missions; and thirdly, the conditions precedent, concurrent and subsequent
affecting the securities issue. These conditions include the requiring of the
Commissioner's approval of the stock subscription forms; requiring of a
disclosure of the true copy of the Commissioner's permit to subscribers
prior to taking their subscriptions; the impounding of the proceeds of the
security sale to meet the minimum budget; the escrowing of the promoter's
shares and the subordinating of said shares in relation to shares sold for
cash until the cash investors have received preferred cumulative dividends;
protecting such shares sold for cash against the promoter's shares as to
participation in assets on dissolution and requiring the transfer of the vot-
ing control from the promoter to the cash investors in the event the pro-
moter is unable to operate the corporation profitably within a two-year
period. It is obvious, therefore, that the permit of the Commissioner is an
exercise of administrative determination and discretion far beyond the
provisions the issuer may choose to make in a registration of disclosure
system.
History of Securities Regulation in the States
Securities regulation was begun by the states as early as 1911, and by
the federal government twenty-two years later in 1933. Kansas and Rhode
Island are credited with having been the first states to enact a modern
securities regulation statute known as Blue Sky Law.6 Today, nearly all
the states except Delaware7 and Nevada8 have some form of Blue Sky Law.
5 See full analysis of the permit system, BALLANTINE & STEaLMG, op. cit. supra, 601-08.
See also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25507, 25508, 25512.
6 KAN. STAT. C. 133 (1911).
7 A single paragraph anti-fraud statute was enacted in Delaware in 1931, but this was
omitted from the 1931 Delaware Code, so that at this date (1957) Delaware does not have any
securities regulation statute.
s Nevada had a statute regulating securities only, which was repealed 1915. NEv. STAT.
c. 56 (1909) and c. 59 (1915).
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In passing, it might be said that a far graver situation confronts the
states and federal government than the problem of possible uniformity of
securities regulation acts. That grave problem is the flow of securities from
the two states, Nevada and Delaware, where no regulation exists, into the
other 46 states, District of Columbia, and the Territories of Hawaii and
Alaska and Puerto Rico.
During the period 1911 to 1920, all the 46 states except Delaware and
Nevada enacted some one or more of the four basic features of securities
regulations, namely: (1) fraud, (2) licensing of brokers, dealers and
agents, (3) registration or disclosure, and (4) permit authority.9
The federal government commenced its securities regulation by enact-
ment in 1933 of the Securities Act' 0 followed by enactment in the ensuing
year of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' Subsequently, Congress
amended the Bankruptcy Acts in regard to corporate re-organizations by
Sections 77A and 77B of the United States Bankruptcy Acts,' the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939,15 the Investment Companies Act of 1940,1 and the
Maloney Act.'5
The two basic acts of the federal government are the Securities Act
of 1933, providing for the registration of securities offered inter-state in
amounts over $300,000, (originally this minimum was $100,000), and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which regulates the stock exchanges. All
of these acts are administered by the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission in Washington, D.C., aided by the various regional offices of
the SEC in nine geographic regions. It is important to note that Congress
specifically left exclusive jurisdiction as to inter-state transactions in se-
curities to the states where the amount of securities being issued is less
than $300,000 and left concurrent jurisdiction with the states along with
the federal government in issues in excess of $300,000. It is also important
to note that the federal government's Securities Law is a mere disclosure
system or type of securities regulation, not a permit type.'6 Therefore, if
any state is to have the privilege of maintaining or adopting a permit sys-
9 It is presumed that the forthcoming book analyzing the Blue Sky laws of the various
states, edited by Loss and Cowett, will set the history of Blue Sky legislation in the states and
will be as full and accurate a source of such legislation as to satisfy most persons interested
in the subject.
1048 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1952).
1148 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1952).
1248 STAT. 909 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1952).
13 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1952).
14 54 STAT. 716 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-z (1952).
1549 STAT. 1375 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1952).
16 See note 4, supra.
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tern of securities regulation, it must necessarily go far beyond the mere
disclosure system of the federal law.
History of Blue Sky Law Regulations in California
The first Blue Sky Law in California was the Investment Companies
Act of 1913.17 This law applied to public sales of securities only, not to
closed issues. Obviously, any promoter with any degree of imagination
simply evaded that law by having the corporation issue securities to the
promoter and/or to a closed group and immediately thereafter redistrib-
uted the securities to the public. The loophole in this law was effectively
stopped by the enactment of the Corporate Securities Act of 1917.18 The
California Corporate Securities Act, later entitled Corporate Securities Law
and made a part of the Corporations Code, 9 has been amended or revised
at every general session of the legislature from 1917 to the present and it
seems safe to predict that it will continue to be amended at each future
general session of the legislature. The need for improvement of the law or
plugging of loopholes created by imaginative promoters would appear to
justify this prediction.
A careful study of the amendments of the past 40 years will illustrate
the ingenuity of those who try to evade securities legislation and the readi-
ness of the legislature to plug these loopholes as rapidly as they are created.
Also, the continued efforts of the Commissioner of Corporations, the State
Bar, and business men, to strengthen the act justifies these continuous
amendments. It is generally admitted that California has the most thorough
and effective securities regulation statute among all the 46 states which
have some form of securities legislation. No one would argue that the Cali-
fornia legislation is perfect or complete; however, with many hundreds of
attorney general's opinions and court decisions interpreting the Corporate
Securities Law of California over a period of 40 years, and with the rules
and regulations of the Commission adopted over 40 years of experience in
administering the law, there is a strong foundation for the foregoing state-
ment. It is obvious that such a law should not be lightly cast aside for some
less effective type of securities legislation in the form of a mediocre dis-
closure type of securities legislation.
Perhaps the most important philosophy behind the Corporate Securities
Law of California is that the "seller shall beware"-not the buyer. In dis-
closure systems, as contrasted with permit systems, the emphasis is "let
the buyer beware", even though the buyer may be incapable of intelligently
17 CAL. STAT. c.353 (1913).
18 CAL. STAT. c. 532 (1917).
19 CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 25000-26104.
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analyzing the voluminous registration statement or prospectus and exhibits.
The underlying test in the permit system is that the applicant seeking
authority from the Commissioner of Corporations of the State of California
must convince the Commissioner that the proposed plan of business, issue
of securities, and manner and method of sale thereof, are fair, just and
equitable, honest, and will not work a fraud upon the purchasers of the
securities. If the applicant does not so satisfy the Commissioner, the appli-
cation for permit authority shall be denied. In a disclosure system, on the
contrary, the proposed issue and/or underwriter of the securities need only
tell the truth, omitting no material facts, no matter how unfair, unjust,
and inequitable the proposed issue may be, and the public may be sold such
securities. Quoting from an address by the Honorable Ralph Demmler,
Chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, at the
Thirty-seventh Annual Convention of the National Association of Securi-
ties Administrators in 1954,1 Mr. Demmler frankly stated as to the dis-
closure statute as follows:
"The Federal statute, of course, leaves an investor free to part with his
money like the proverbial fool. It is based on a relatively non-paternalistic
doctrine that the role of Government in policing the sale of securities is ful-
filled when the investor is assured of a legal right to get the facts and a
remedy in case of fraud. Is that an adequate protection of investors? No
one contends that every investor reads the prospectus any more than the
millions of people covered by life insurance read their policies. Neverthe-
less a disclosure statute accomplishes two things in addition to getting
through, at least to some investors, the information set forth in the regis-
tration statement. First, the very fact that transactions of a suspect char-
acter must be disclosed probably prevents many such transactions from
ever taking place. Second, while the prospectuses may not be read by indi-
vidual purchasers generally, they are read by analysts, bankers, and other
specialists through whom the information is disseminated and whose ap-
praisal contributes to the fixing of a market price more nearly fair than
could be fixed if the information were not available."
As Professor Loss has said from time to time, the mere disclosure act of
the federal government allows the issuer and/or underwriter to sell any-
thing, as long as the truth is told.
Why a Uniform Securities Act for All the States
Perhaps, before we even attempt to answer why a uniform act for all
the states, shouldn't we admit that while it might be possible, it's almost
certain that many of the states will not adopt the proposed model uniform
securities regulation act even as Delaware and Nevada for 40 years have
20 See Proceedings of the 37the Annual Convention of National Association of Securities
Administrators, Sept. 27-30, 1954, pp. 71-74.
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refused to adopt any part of the four basic means of securities regulation.
Since the probability of all states adopting a uniform act is most unlikely,
we might drop the subject, there, except for the fact that there seems to be
some pressure arising from various sources toward the states to adopt the
proposed uniform securities regulation act. Why is there a hue and cry for
such adoption of the Proposed Model Uniform Securities Regulation Act?
According to the Los Angeles Bar Committee Report quoted in part below,
we note the following comment by James E. Dunlap, one of the members
of the Corporation Committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association, in an
appendix to the formal report of the Committee dated June 25, 1957,
wherein he states:
"In evaluating the act, the position has been taken that absolute uniformity
among the states is impossible and not necessarily desirable and, further,
that the need for uniformity differs in different parts of the legislation.
Consideration has also been given to Section 415 of the proposed act, which
declares a legislative intent of uniformity. This declaration of intent can
be expected to influence judicial interpretation so that fundamental divi-
sions of interpretation are not unlikely to arise.
"There is little doubt that uniformity among the states would be of great
assistance in enabling a general practitioner to advise his clients as to the
applicability and effect of foreign Blue Sky Laws on security transactions;
however, it appears that most of the pressure for the uniform law has come
from the large brokerage houses and their attorneys who are well acquaint-
ed with the laws of all 48 states. They are of the opinion that the discrep-
ancies of the present laws are such that they needlessly complicate and
burden the national distribution of generally acceptable securities. The
purpose of this report is to determine how successfully the proposed uni-
form law has removed the complications and burdens now caused by the
lack of uniformity among the states. The desirability of various provisions
as such is not considered except where necessary to properly weigh the
advantages of uniformity."
If the pressure for adoption of uniform legislation is from the large
brokerage houses and their attorneys who are well acquainted with the law
of all 48 states, then it would appear that there is little need of urging
repeal of the effective California permit system law for a mediocre or mere
disclosure statute. A partial analysis of the great bulk of the securities sold
to the California public by the large brokerage houses indicates that ap-
proximately $2,000,000,000 of securities are sold each year to the Cali-
fornia public by large brokerage houses, practically all of which is through
underwritings in which California licensed brokers estimate that they sell
from 10% to 20% of the total national underwriting registered with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Only rarely do the
large brokerage houses distribute securities to California residents under
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a "best efforts contract"'" and therefore under a permit. It is safe to say
that the principal reason why the brokers rarely sell under a "best efforts
contract" and under a permit is that the cream of the securities issued are
underwritten while the skimmed milk type of securities issued does not
justify or merit an underwriting. Therefore the weaker issues are covered
by permits and should be carefully and thoroughly regulated under the
permit system, rather than allowing such issues to reach our public under
a mere disclosure act, where you merely tell all the facts without regard to
the standards of fair, just and equitable, honesty, and the anti-fraud tests
which could be applied through a permit system. In fact, on the "under-
written securities", registration statement and exhibits are practically the
only material required to be filed with the Commissioner of Corporations
of the State of California to qualify such issues for trading.2" Of course,
the appointment of the Commissioner and the resident agent for receipt of
service of process is required. While the great majority of the securities
registered with the SEC submitted for qualification in California are ac-
ceptable to the Commissioner, there are a few issues, such as the Tucker
Automobile promotion case,' where the proposed security issue does not
measure up to the California Corporation Commissioner's determination
of what is fair, just and equitable, and as a result such securities registered
with the SEC are denied qualification for trading in California, thus saving
millions of dollars to our California residents.
History of the Proposed Model Uniform Securities
Regulation Act
An early draft of a model uniform securities regulation act was ap-
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and by the American Bar Association in 1929. As to the success of
this early draft, Professor Loss stated at the 37th Annual Convention of
Securities Administrators in New York, 1954, as follows:
"Its success was something less than phenomenal. It was adopted only by
Louisiana and Hawaii and, with various modifications, in a handful of other
states. Actually, it became outmoded only four years after its approval.
When the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 shifted the emphasis to
Federal-State coordination, the conference finally struck it from the list of
approved acts in 1944 .... In 1947 a special committee of the American
2 1 A best efforts contract is a mere agency undertaking by a broker, as contrasted with a
true underwriting where the broker is legally bound by contract to purchase any share not
resold to customers.
22 Qualification for trading in true underwritings and on resale of outstanding securities
by licensed brokers is accomplished by filing the prospectus with the Commissioner of Corpora-
tions subject to his disapproval if not satisfactory. See CA.. CoRp. CODE §§ 25600-604.
2 See file number 85675 LA. Division of Corporations, State of California.
N~ov., 19571 CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW
Bar Association recommended that the conference be requested to consider
a uniform or model act in cooperation with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Three successive drafts,--which
were largely the work of the very able chairman of the American Bar Asso-
ciation Committee on State Regulation, Robert M. Blair-Smith, of the
Philadelphia Bar-were considered in 1949, 1951, and 1953, by the appro-
priate committee of the conference.
"The 1953 meeting of the conference was held in Boston and Commis-
sioner Edward L. Schwartz of the Boston Bar, Chairman of the conference
Sub-Committee on the Uniform Securities Act, invited me to attend the
meeting of the parent section of the conference. That section disapproved
the third draft and was about to recommend to the conference that the
entire idea of a uniform or model securities statute be dropped, on the
ground that the legislative philosophy of the states were too diverse. But
the members reconsidered when it was suggested that a model statute might
be drafted in several parts, each corresponding to one of the basic regula-
tory philosophies. Thus, Part I might deal with fraud, Part II with broker-
dealer registration, and Part III with securities regulations."
It was here that the writer believes Professor Loss and whoever else
entered the discussion made the error of overlooking the Part IV philoso-
phy of regulation of securities, namely the permit system.
Professor Loss continued to state in the aforesaid address, as follows:
"Under the scheme of things a state like New Jersey, which wanted to
continue with a pure 'fraud' philosophy, might adopt only Part I (and the
general provisions); a state like Pennsylvania, which wanted to combine
anti-fraud provisions with a system of broker-dealer registration, might
adopt Parts I and II (and the general provisions); and most of the states
might consider the entire statute. This basic approach,--I wish I could say
it were my own, but it has a rather mixed paternity-was received with so
much enthusiasm that the conference committee was instructed to prepare
a fourth draft accordingly."
Professor Loss stated that, some months later, he was consulted by
representatives of the conference with a view to preparing a suitable draft;
that he spoke to Mr. Cavers, Associate Dean of Harvard Law School, where
Professor Loss was then teaching; that Mr. Cavers was in charge of re-
search and had some months previously voiced the possibility of a Blue
Sky study. Professor Loss reported that the result was that they under-
took to make such a study under a grant which the Harvard Law School
obtained from the Merrill Foundation for Advancement of Financial
Knowledge, Inc.
An advisory committee was set up, the composition of which is out-
lined on Pages 37 and 38 of the Proceedings of the 37th Annual Conference
of the National Association of Securities Administrators.
It is interesting to note Professor Loss' earlier report in 1954 to the
Securities Administrators Convention, in part as follows:
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"For better or for worse, we are living under a Federal system. In my
opinion it is for better, even with the cumbersome and dual regulation. If
we had attempted a unitary government for this vast and variegated coun-
try, we might long since have fallen apart at the seams. As Justice Brandeis
put it in one of his great decisions: 'It is one of the happy incidents of the
Federal system that a single, courageous state, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.' Accordingly, we see no point in looking for ways
to make New York yield to California's philosophy in this field or vice
versa. Not only would this be an idle dream; we are not even sure that it
would be desirable in principle."
Mr. Robert Blair-Smith, chairman of the American Bar Association
Committee for State Regulation, whom Professor Loss referred to as the
author of the three drafts of the uniform securities act turned down in
1949, 1951, and 1953, and disapproved by the Sub-Committee on a Uni-
form Securities Act, commented in a recent article on the use of these three
parts of the proposed act:
"Although it is entitled a 'Uniform Securities Act', it is not intended for
adoption as a whole by every state, but is constructed in four parts (the
fourth being the general section) so that any one or more of the first three
(the substantive parts) may be selected by any state, according to the reg-
ulatory philosophy prevailing at the time."24
Where did this leave California and the other states which have a permit
philosophy of securities regulation? The answer is, of course, that Cali-
fornia's philosophy is either apparently ignored or deemed too strict to be
considered in a model uniform act.
Honorable Ralph Demmler, Chairman of the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, stated again to the National Convention of
Securities Administrators in 1954 as follows:
"The Federal statute, however, is not a qualification statute. Section 23
-makes it clear that the Securities and Exchange Commission does not ap-
prove and may not approve issues and that it is unlawful for anyone to
represent that it has approved any issues. This does not seem to be realized
by many members of the public, so I say it again in the hope that you and
'your staffs will help to disseminate a public appreciation of the fact.'
"Yet the fact that we have had such statutes since the original Kansas
Act of 1911 indicates that the qualification approach is still highly regarded
in some areas. Justice Holmes repeatedly expounded the philosophy that
the states are laboratories in which economic ideas can be tried and proved
or tried and found wanting. I suggest that this trial process is just what has
been going on in the states over the years in respect of the offering of
securities and particularly in respect of the imposition of qualification
standards."
24 Business, Vol. XI, no. 4, p. 111, July, 1956.
Nov. 1957]
In the report of Proceedings of the 38th Annual Convention of the
National Association of Securities Administrators, held in Vancouver and
Victoria, B.C. in 1955, Professor Loss went into a considerably detailed
analysis and explanation of the progress of the draft of the Model Uniform
Securities Regulation Act. This report, appearing at Page 43, quotes Mr.
Lammy of the Oil Securities Committee reporting as follows:
"In order that the administrators of both the class of security laws known
as 'Permit Method', or regulation, or the class known as 'Registration
Method', may have the benefit of the Committee's study, the following poli-
cies are recommended to each Security Administrator for adoption as stand-
ard, in handling applications for permits or registrations in dealing with
organizations engaged in purely exploratory ventures."
He then outlined policies recommended in States With Permit Systems.
This insert is clearly to demonstrate that the Security Administrators at
their national convention recognized and distinguished the permit system
as contrasted with the registration or disclosure system of securities reg-
ulation.
Particular attention is called to Professor Loss' discussion of the basis
for issuance of a stop order against issuers under Section 306(7) of his
early draft of the model uniform securities act, as he discussed the same
at the 38th Annual Convention of the National Association of Securities
Administrators, wherein he states:
"If the offering would be made on terms which are unfair, unjust, and in-
equitable, by reason of the amount of commissions, options, promoters
profits and number of similar things, it would not be enough for you to say
simply 'I don't like the terms of the offering'. You will have to find that the
terms of the offering are unfair, because there is too much promoter's profit,
too many options or similar things; that ties your hands a little, but at the
same time-I am talking to the administrators now-I think it gives you
fairly broad powers-some of my friends in the industry have said too
broad powers-to stop offerings where the options, promoters' profits, or
commissions, are outrageous."
In the fourth and final draft of the model act, this Section 306 (a) (2) (f)
-has been redrafted to read that the ground for issuance of a stop order
is that the administrator would find (1) that the issuance of the (stop)
order is in the public interest, (2) that ... (f) the offering has been or
would be made with unreasonable amounts of options, underwriters' and
sellers' discounts, commissions or other compensation, or promoters' profits,
or participation.
Apparently, the words "not fair, just, and equitable" are dropped and
the words "not in the public interest" are substituted, but the facts that
make the administrator determine that it is either not just, fair and equita-
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ble or that it is not in the public interest are practically the same; namely,
unreasonable amounts of underwriters' commissions, options, promoters'
profits, etc., so we end up finding, because of these unreasonable amounts
of underwriters' commissions, options, and promoters' profits in finding it
to be against the public interest instead of unfair, unjust, and inequitable.
This appears to be like Tweedledum and Tweedledee, or double-talk.
Professor Loss explains that it was not thought to be desirable to fix
an arbitrary percentage by statutory provision or rule because it would be
either too low for some types of offering, or so high as to be largely mean-
ingless. He states:
"On the other hand, some of the statutes in the group as well as many
others, permit administrators to attack the problem of excessive selling
costs under some such broad standard as 'fair, just, and equitable' (Cali-
fornia), 'inequitable' (Illinois), 'more a scheme to profit at the expense of
the purchasers' (Kansas), or 'grossly unfair terms' (Ohio)."
Professor Loss states that sub-section (f) above discussed solves the
whole problem of unreasonable promoters' profits against which the Blue
Sky Laws have been traditionally directed as well as the recently acceler-
ated problem of unreasonable options whether issued to promoters or to
underwriters, insiders or other persons.
An administrator still has either to adopt a rule or rules regarding
maximum underwriters commissions, options, promoter's participations, or
judge each case on its merits, in which case the administrator will undoubt-
edly fix different maximum commissions for different types of financing,
and in the eyes of the law he will be fixing a figure beyond which it will be
unreasonable, therefore unjust, unfair, and inequitable, and not in the
public interest to go beyond such a fixed figure.
Professor Loss attempts to explain why he used the terminology "regis-
tration system". He says on Page 44 of the fourth and final draft of the
Model Uniform Securities Regulation Act, dated June 1, 1956, as follows:
"It is, therefore, the draftsmen's view, which it is understood the California
Commissioner of Corporations does not share, that there is no inherent dif-
ference between the so-called 'permit system' and the so-called 'registra-
tion system'. That is to say, this statute uses the word 'registration' in the
generic sense-the sense in which it is most commonly used in the existing
statutes-rather than in the Federal disclosure sense or the Massachusetts
notice-to-sell sense. A uniform act should attempt to arrive at an optimum
procedure and an optimum set of substantive standards. When that end has
been achieved, no purpose would be served by recognizing a terminological
difference between a 'registration statement' and a 'permit'. This is not to
say that the permit tradition in California has not made for a somewhat
different emphasis and flavor. But it is precisely the purpose of this uniform
Nov, 1957] CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW
statute to fix upon a single emphasis and flavor within each of the major
regulatory philosophies represented by the first three parts of the act."
On the third appearance by Professor Loss before the Convention of
National Securities Administrators, he stated:'
"Now I should say one thing before stopping on this point: We have left
out a reference to 'fair, just, and equitable'. That is found today in about
15 statutes, and that is largely the reason that California voted against the
act in the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law,
as well as Nevada. I must confess that I find the point quite troublesome.
If I were administrator in a state which had such a standard today, I do not
know how happy I would be abandoning it. I would certainly have a little
reluctance to abandon it. You have to make a choice in a uniform act. If
we put the standard in, we would be following the minority view. Leaving
the standard out, at least we are following the majority pattern today. And
we took that view not because we always followed the majority pattern-
we did not where we thought it was ill-advised-but because we think-
and this is no question of basic morals, but a question on which reasonable
men can differ-we think that in a well-ordered Blue Sky Law, with all of
these other standards you don't need a standard of 'fair, just, and equitable'
in order to function properly. We think that law ought to be as definite as it
can be. I do not like to go around mouthing that this is 'a government of
laws and not of men', because those are just words. We all believe in 'a gov-
ernment of laws' just as we all believe that sin is evil, but we all know that
laws have to be administered by men. We all know that in an administra-
tive statute, no matter how definite you are, you have to have some flexi-
bility. But when all that is said, the fact is, to my mind, that law generally
ought to be as specific as you can make it. You ought not to use vague lan-
guage, such as 'fair, just, and equitable' unless you have to. We do not
think you have to. If a particular state disagrees with us, it would be a
fairly simple matter to put additional standards in the statute in that state.
But we recommend the standards which are in here now." 251
In one breath, Professor Loss states that the California Securities Law
is too vague and in another that this is too strict. In one breath he says
the California law is unique and cannot be included in the three-part pat-
tern of the model uniform securities regulation act, and in another breath
2 5 Report of Proceedings of 39th Annual Convention, p. 73.
25a The Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention of the National Association of Securities Ad-
ministrators (now changed to North American Association of Securities Administrators) re-
solved in their convention September 9-12, 1956 as to the MODEL UNrroRM SEcuRrrrss AcT
as follows: "Resolved: that subject to the provisions of Paragraph 2, Chapter II, entitled:
'Objects: Constitution of NASA,' the Uniform Act be approved as presented."
On reconsideration at this current convention of the NASA, October 7-10, 1957 the fol-
lowing clarifying resolution was adopted by unanimous vote except for Ohio abstaining: "Now,
therefore, it is hereby resolved, that Dr. Louis Loss is commended for the laborious task which
he has undertaken and completed but that the Administrators did not intend to and did not
approve or recommend the adoption of the proposed Uniform Act in any State."
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he states that in his opinion the permit system and the registration system
are inherently the same thing.
It appears quite clear that the mere disclosure system and the strict
permit system are very distinct and different forms of security regulation.
It would appear that we should study the model act not with an eye to its
adoption in California in lieu of our strong effective California securities
law, but with an eye to improving our permit system with any additional
provisions that may be borrowed from the model uniform act. This article
could not possibly cover the ground set forth in the report of the Los An-
geles Bar Association Committee on Corporations which discussed in detail
the proposed model act, but we may summarize by referring to that por-
tion of the report by James E. Dunlap wherein he discusses the proposed
Uniform Securities Regulation Act in contrast to the California Corporate
Securities Act. Mr. Dunlap states that while the Part I, in regard to fraud
does achieve a fair degree of uniformity, such uniformity is of little conse-
quence to the securities industry. As to the registration of broker-dealers
part of the model act, he says that while a relative degree of uniformity
has been achieved, such uniformity would not seem to be of any real im-
portance. As to the first subdivision of Part III, relating to registration by
notification, he says that while it is, of course, of extreme importance to
have relative uniformity in connection with the registration of securities
to be sold nationally, on the other hand, it is of only minor importance for
issues to be sold only in one or two different states. Registration by noti-
fication applies only to corporations who have been in continuous operation
for five years and have not defaulted in interest or dividends on senior
securities for the immediately preceding three years. As to registration by
coordination, he states that, since most national distributions will be reg-
istered by coordination, the highest degree of uniformity is desirable. On
the other hand, he states, since there is no guarantee that a security regis-
tered by coordination meets any minimum standards, the administrator will
want the maximum discretion in determining whether an offering should
be made in the state. As commented upon hereinabove, the great bulk of
underwritten national issues will qualify by filing their registration state-
ments and appointments of the Commissioner and resident agent for serv-
ice of process with the Commissioner of Corporations. As to those issues
which do not measure up, such as the Tucker Automobile promotion,2 as
above stated, the California Commissioner should have discretion to turn
down such issues, even though registered with SEC. Mr. Dunlap continues
to comment that only very few states require a registrant to supply any
material already furnished the SEC, and accordingly, it would appear that
2 See note 23, supra.
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the uniformity achieved by the model act is not substantially greater than
that which now exists. He also states parenthetically that it should be
noted that in states which now require only notification, typical filings, the
filing burdens would be increased with the adoption of the uniform law.
As to registration by qualification, Mr. Dunlap comments that this proce-
dure will be used only by securities not qualifying for registration by noti-
fication and not being registered with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.17 He states that since virtually all widely distributed securities
involve offerings of over $300,000, and must be registered with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, all issues will not be concerned with the
procedure for registration by qualification. In this field the need for uni-
formity is not great. It is important to note that some 16,000 permits per
annum are issued by the Commissioner of Corporations of the State of
California, of an aggregate amount of approximately $2,000,000 which are
covered purely by the permit system, rather than by the qualifying regis-
tration statements on national underwritings and it is in this field of 16,000
corporate permits per annun that the permit system is most vital to the
protection of our California investing public.
Mr. Dunlap comments on the provision for escrow and impound pro-
visions in Section 365g of the Model Uniform Act and says that no stand-
ards are set forth to guide the administrator in determining whether such
requirements should be imposed and for that reason, there is not likely to
be much uniformity in its application. He states that the escrow require-
ment can only be used in the case of issuers with securities outstanding
which were sold substantially below the present public offering price or for
a consideration other than cash, and that this is a narrow application of the
escrow condition. He says, therefore, that little protection is to be gained
by such an escrow provision, and that because of the ineffectiveness of this
section and its tendency to reduce the uniformity which the proposed act
is designed to achieve, it is difficult to justify the escrow provision in its
present recommended form. He further states that as the escrow provision
is now written, the right of the administrator to impose conditions of escrow
probably cannot be construed as authorizing him to require a subordination
of the promoters interests in dividends or liquidation rights and, I might
add, the waiver of voting rights where the promoter may be either dishonest
or unsuccessful in operating the company. Such waiver conditions are a
vital appendage to the escrow condition to protect the California cash in-
vestors against promoters' interests. He further states that the lack of
uniformity in applying the impound requirements made possible because
27 See appendix to Report of Committee on Corporations, Los Angeles Bar Association,
April, 1957.
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of the lack of a statutory standard for its application could cause consider-
able hardship with regard to an offering registered with the SEC.
Need for Critical Study
Time does not allow voluminous additional criticism that could be made
of the model uniform securities regulation act but in view of the fact that
the Los Angeles Bar Association Board of Trustees have been asked to
authorize the Committee on Corporations to devote an additional year to
the study of the model act, and in view of the fact that there is a possibility
that some may urge the adoption of said act at the coming, or an early suc-
ceeding California legislative session, it is deemed of grave and vital im-
portance that we make haste slowly; that the bar associations in northern
California, particularly in San Francisco and the Bay Region, as well as
other industrial centers in northern California, launch upon detailed studies
of the proposed uniform securities regulation act, with an eye toward fur-
ther strengthening our own Corporate Securities Law while adopting any
advantageous provisions from the model uniform act, rather than casting
aside our act and losing the 40 years benefit of experience, practice, inter-
pretation by Attorney General and courts, and familiarity of Bar, security
brokers, and business men with what we proudly believe to be the best
securities regulatory act in the United States.
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